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FIVE DECISIVE YEARS: 
SCHOPENHAUER’S EPISTEMOLOGY AS 
REFLECTED IN HIS THEORY OF COLOUR 
Introduction: Schopenhauer as an Enlightened Romantic 
IT IS ALMOST commonplace to say that the life and works of Arthur 
Schopenhauer confront the observer with a puzzling combination of 
heterogeneous ideas. “Schopenhauer’s gospel of resignation is not very 
consistent and not very sincere”, Bertrand Russell complained,’ and in 
summing up he dismissed him as a somewhat curious, if not altogether 
uninteresting, outsider from the mainstream of Western thought. Thomas 
Mann on the other hand hailed the “mixture of Voltaire and Jakob BGhme to 
be found in him”’ and maintained that precisely because of this apparent 
contradiction Schopenhauer was the herald of a new, as yet unborn, 
“pessimistic humanism”. Leaving this prediction aside for the moment we 
may at least agree that Schopenhauer’s work is a fascinating attempt o unite 
the currents of the l&h-century Enlightenment and of early 19th-century 
Romanticism. The romantic component may readily be recognized in his cult 
of artistic genius and in the lofty place he assigned to music in the hierarchy of 
arts, even though his taste in those matters was rather “classical” and to that 
extent still reflected Enlightenment ideals. His inclination towards mysticism 
and (Indian) exoticism was deeply romantic; yet the Enlightenment heritage 
was reflected in his firm rejection of Church dogmatism, of flirtations with the 
Middle Ages (“christlich-germanische Fratzen”) and of obscurantism 
generally (“An obscurantist is a fellow who puts out the lights in order that his 
comrades may steal”). His romantic side is most forcefully revealed in his 
pessimism and in his insight into the overwhelming power of the irrational; but 
even here it should be noted that the irrational does not have the last word in 
his doctrine. True, the fact that Schopenhauer’s doctrine took the form of a 
metaphysical system is what connects him with German Idealism - a 
philisophical current which may be characterized as an attempt to provide a 
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philosophical justification for the romantic view of life. But it is equally true 
that no one has protested more violently than Schopenhauer against the 
excesses of this Professorenphilosophie der Philosophieprofessoren, which for 
him culminated in Hegel. It was not by chance that the only Germans he 
admired without restriction were Goethe and Kant. For, even though in one 
sense these two may be claimed to be the precursors of Romanticism and 
German Idealism, respectively, the spirit of the 18th-century was still very 
much alive in both, particularly in Kant. Schopenhauer also had a life-long 
predilection for the French sensualist philosophers Cabanis and Helvetius, 
who, although typical representatives of Lilge de la Raison, nevertheless 
demonstrated at the same time the secondary nature of human reason, and 
thus foreshadowed in their own way the romantic reaction against the 
Enlightenment. Viewed in this light, a remark made by Schopenhauer’s first 
biographer, Wilhelm Gwinner, that it was Schopenhauer’s life-task “to 
complement the ethical realism of Kant with the physical realism of the 
sensualists as well as with the aesthetic realism of Goethe”3 becomes less 
paradoxical than this odd combination may appear to be at first sight. In fact, 
the profound truth of Gwinner’s remark, in particular where Schopenhauer’s 
epistemology is concerned, can be demonstrated through a careful 
examination of the decisive role his early optical studies have played in the 
development of his mature thought. This is what I shall set out to show in the 
following pages. In doing so, I shall first give a general account of 
Schopenhauer’s interpretation of Kantianism. For a better understanding of 
the originality of this interpretation I shall next briefly sketch Goethe’s 
influence on Schopenhauer, since it was Goethe’s Farbenlehre which initiated 
Schopenhauer’s own studies in the field of optics. And it was those studies 
which, in turn, by deepening Schopenhauer’s interest in physiology, were to 
have a decisive influence on the development of his epistemology. I shall 
illustrate this on the basis of an analysis of Schopenhauer’s most original 
contribution to epistemology: his causal theory of perception. The final 
section will then be devoted to a critical apprectation of Schopenhauer’s 
epistemology in the light of subsequent developments. 
Schopenhauer and Kant 
Schopenhauer never ceased to claim that, unlike the Windbeutel, 
Unsinnschmierer and Charlatane who dominated the German universities, he 
was the only legitimate heir to Kantian philosophy. Rightly so? One might 
dismiss this question as irrelevant, since the validity of a man’s thought 
certainly does not depend on its being true to Kant or not. Yet Schopenhauer’s 
‘Wilhelm Gwinner, Arthur Schopenhauer auspers6nlichem Umgang dargestellt. Ein Blick auf 
sein Leben, seinen Charakter und seine Lehre (Leipzig, 1862), p. 52. 
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claim upon Kant’s legacy stamped his entire philosophy and therefore it does 
make sense to present some plausible arguments both for and against the 
validity of this claim. 
In contrast to the German Idealists, Schopenhauer sticks firmly to the 
Kantian distinction of “phenomenon” and “thing-in-itself”. This is indeed a 
crucial point, in spite of the dubious ontological dualism which these terms 
imply. For at the heart of this distinction lies the much more fundamental 
episternological dualism, which has found its classical expression in the 
distinction Kant made at the end of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the 
first Critique between intuitus originarius and intuitus derivativus. The former 
would enable its happy possessor to dispense with the necessity of discursive 
thinking, which is why he could only be the Urwesen, i.e. God, but never a 
dependant creature.4 For, as Kant asserts, the very fact that man is a thinking 
creature proves that he is a finite creature. Only a divine intellect could grasp 
everything in one act of intellektuelle Anschauung. Kant did not claim the 
possession of such a faculty and neither did Schopenhauer. Indeed, in Die 
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung he ironically confesses that he belongs to those 
“profanes”, who completely lack Vernunft-Anschauung and that he therefore 
must refrain from giving the reader any information on the Absolute, in which 
Thought and Being are said to be identical.’ This fundamental dichotomy 
between Thought and Being - which is indeed the starting-point of all critical 
thinking - corresponds, in the ethical sphere, to a similar dichotomy between 
“facts” and “ideals”, or between the world as it is and as it ought to be. This 
“ethical realism”, as Gwinner called it, is one more thing Schopenhauer had in 
common with Kant, which did not prevent him from presenting a rather 
devastating criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy.6 But this does not concern 
us here; for us the point is that their shared “ethical realism” fortunately made 
both thinkers immune to any divinization of world-history. In one sense this 
may be called la qualite’de leur deyault, the deyault being that, in an epoch 
which was marked by a growing awareness of the historical dimension of the 
world of nature as well as the world of man, both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s 
outlook remained essentially unhistorical. Although in his treatise Ideen einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht, Kant proclaimed that it is 
man’s destiny to develop his faculties in the evolution of society, he founded 
his Kritik der reinen Vernunft on the assumption that Euclidean geometry, 
Aristotelian logic and Newtonian dynamics were timeless and universally 
valid. He seems never to have posed himself the question why then humanity 
had to wait for their appearance for so long. And Schopenhauer, here a true 
4Kanfs Werke ZZZ (Berlin: Akademie Textausgabe, 1968), p. 72f. 
5swzz, p. 30f. 
%chopenhauer’s most systematic treatment of Kant’s moral philosophy is in Die beiden 
Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften (in SW ZV). 
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disciple of Plato, was of the opinion that the unchangeable and everlasting is 
the only thing that concerns the philosopher, just as for him, as a disciple of 
Kant, Time was an attribute of the phenomenal world only, not of the “Thing- 
in-itself”. The only philosophical significance the study of history can have is 
to find out what remains identical under all change, i.e. the fundamental 
qualities of the human heart and brain, which are mostly evil. 
The motto of history in general should be: Eadem, sed aliter. If anyone has read 
Herodotus, he has, from a philosophical point of view, already sufficiently studied 
history. For there is already to be found everything which constitutes subsequent 
history: the strivings, doings, sufferings and fate of mankind, such as it results from 
the previously mentioned human qualities and from the physical conditions of life 
on earth.’ 
The historian may deplore this lack of historical interest, but perhaps his regret 
will be outweighed by a sense of gratitude that this shortcoming at least had 
the merit of saving those thinkers from the Hegelian- Marxist pitfall of a 
teleological interpretation of history. 
But Schopenhauer’s claim of being the only legitimate heir to Kantian 
philosophy has its questionable sides, too. One important reason for doubt is 
that Schopenhauer’s Kantian distinction between “phenomenon” and “thing- 
in-itself” did not prevent him from claiming to know what the “thing-in- 
itself” is like, and thus from constructing a metaphysical system after all. A 
metaphysics of sorts, no doubt, since it seeks the “thing-in-itself”, not in some 
higher sphere, but rather in the innermost region of the empirical world-the 
world of inner experience. After having thus identified his own “thing-in- 
itself” with Will, he proceeds by way of analogy to identify the Will with the 
thing-in-itself tout court. In justice to Schopenhauer it should be added that he 
was well aware of the metaphorical nature of this universalized “Will”. The 
Will is that which presents itself within US as thing-in-itself but the Will as we 
find and perceive it within us, is not strictly speaking the “thing-in-itself”. 
What the “thing-in-itself” ultimately is, beyond its presenting itself within US 
as Will, we cannot know. Thus in contrast with Schopenhauer’s epistemology, 
his metaphysics did not claim more than a kind of approximate validity, 
though unfortunately Schopenhauer was sometimes inclined to forget this 
praiseworthy restriction.’ 
‘SW III, p. 508. cf. also Arthur Hiibscher, Denker gegen den Strom. Schopenhauer gestern - 
heute - morgen (Bonn, 1982), p. 74 and 195f. 
‘This is most obvious in Ueber den Willen in der Natur (in SW IV). For the metaphorical 
character of Schopenhauer’s “Will” cf. the excellent introduction by Volker Spierling 
(“Erkenntnis und Nat&‘) to Arthur Schopenhauer, Metaphysik der Natur. Philosophische 
Vorlesungen, Teil II (Miinchen, 1984), p. 44f. 
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Die Welt als Wille - this is one side of the coin, the other side being Die 
Welt als Vorstellung. Schopenhauer identifies the phenomenal world much 
more unequivocally than Kant had done with the sum of our Vorstellungen,’ 
thus giving Kantian epistemology a distinctly idealistic twist. In so doing he 
acted in accordance with the “physical realism” (Gwinner) of the French 
materialists, especially Pierre-Jean Georges Cabanis. 
This sounds wildly paradoxical and requires some explanation. 
Schopenhauer’s most systematic treatment of Kant is found in his “Kritik 
der kantischen Philosophie”, which he wrote as a supplement o his main 
work Die Welt als Wille and Vorstellung. Speaking of the distinction between 
“phenomenon” and “thing-in-itself” he argues that this distinction is correct 
by itself, but that the way in which Kant deduced it is wrong. His criticism here 
runs closely parallel to one presented earlier by Schopenhauer’s former teacher 
of philosophy in Gottingen, G. E. Schulze, in his Aenesidemus. Kant is 
reproached for having asserted that the phenomenon, i.e. the visual world, 
must have an intelligible cause which is not itself a phenomenon and therefore 
is not an object of possible experience. Kant does so in spite of his own 
repeated warnings that causality, being a category of thought, can only be 
applied to possible experience, since these categories have no other function 
than to order the phenomena of the sensual world and are meaningless beyond 
it.” According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s “unbelievable lack of consistency 
here” can only be explained by his constant fear that his “criticism” might be 
mistaken for a kind of Berkeleyan idealism. Now Berkeley is one of those few 
thinkers whose influence on Schopenhauer can hardly be overrated; and if one 
wishes to understand Schopenhauer’s relation to Kantianism one should 
always keep in mind that for him Kantianism is essentially a more 
sophisticated version of Berkeleyanism. This is why Schopenhauer valued the 
first version of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) (which he claimed to have 
rediscovered) far above the better-known second version (1787). The first 
version lacks not only the patronizing remark on “the good Berkeley”, but 
also the - admittedly not very convincing - “refutation of idealism”.” 
Moreover in the chapter on the paralogisms of pure reason the first version 
contains a long digression (suppressed in the second version) in which Kant 
‘It is always difficult to give an adequate English translation of VorsreNung. Older 
Schopenhauer translations generally use “idea”. Now Vorslellung corresponds indeed fairly well 
to “idea” in the Lockean- Humean sense, but since the Platonic Ideas are also present in 
Schopenhauer’s work, this translation has the disadvantage of using the same word for 
Vorstelfung and for Idee, which are wholly different things. Recent translations therefore prefer 
“representation”. The trouble here is that this word has a more realist connotation (a 
representation being a representation “of something”) than Vorstehng. However, since there is 
no better word available, we shall henceforth use it in our translation of Schopenhauer quotations. 
‘OSW II, p. 595f. 
” Kants Werke III, pp. 190 - 193. 
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explicitly presents his own position as a kind of idealism.” In the essay “Zur 
idealistischen Grundansicht’ ’ , which opens the second volume of Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung, Schopenhauer defined this kind of idealism (which is 
also his own) as meaning that the phenomenal world is conditioned by the 
subject in a twofold way: “first materially, or as an object as such, because an 
objective existence is only conceivable in relation to a subject and as 
representation in the latter’s mind; second formally, since an object’s mode of 
existence, i.e. its mode of being represented (space, time, causality), has its 
origin in, and is preconceived by the subject. Thus, simple or Berkeleyan 
idealism, which regards the object as such, is immediately joined by Kantian 
idealism, which regards the specific mode of being an object.13 “No object 
without a subject”; that is for Schopenhauer the important discovery made by 
Berkeley, to which Kant added “only” the formal conditions under which any 
object must necessarily present itself: space, time and causality. Since these 
conditions are a priori known to us, they are a function of our intellect and 
therefore they are just as subjective as our sensations are. To be sure, 
Schopenhauer adds at once that the thesis “no object without a subject” has 
as its necessary corollary the equally irrefutable thesis. “no subject without an 
object”. “For quite as false as the thesis of the uneducated mind: the world, 
the object, would still be there even if there were no subject, is this one: the 
subject would still be a knowing subject even if it had no object, i.e. no 
representation at all. A consciousness without an object is no 
consciousness” .I4 This, however, is still quite compatible with Berkeleyanism, 
and is indeed not directed against Berkeley, but rather against Fichte. For 
while it is true that Berkeley (unlike his successor Hume) only denied the 
existence of material substances and was firmly convinced of the existence of 
mental substances (“spirits”), this did not imply for him that “I am the author 
of my ideas”. Berkeley in fact denied explicitly that this would be the case.15 
In keeping with traditional British empiricism, Berkeley regarded perception 
as an essentially passive process, in which the mind obtains its information 
from the outside. The difference is that for him the outside agent is not - as it 
was for his predecessor Locke - “material substance”. Rather, it is God, 
whose ideas are the objects of our perception. Of course the atheist 
Schopenhauer did not share this particular point of view, nor did he adopt the 
passive interpretation of perception. But the point is that the thesis “no 
subject without an object” does not necessarily imply the “material” nature 
of the latter. As such it is therefore still entirely compatible with Berkeley’s 
“fbid., IV, pp. 230-238. 
“SW III, p. 9. 
141bid., p. 17. 
“Cf. George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (in ‘Bibliotheca 
Philosophorum’, Vol. V, Lipsiae, 1913), p. 68. 
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brand of idealism. But Schopenhauer goes further. There are, he says, two 
fundamentally distinct, though equally legitimate, conceptions of the intellect. 
There is the subjective conception, which takes consciousness as its point of 
departure: this is the only view proper to philosophy. The reason is that every 
science must depart from that about which it has immediate certainty; and for 
philosophy that is consciousness. Yet for the same reason empirical science 
takes the objective world as simply given. Well then: in so doing science shows 
that it is not the intellect that has generated nature, but nature that has 
generated the intellect, since it took a long time before the first eye - upon 
which, according to idealism, the existence of the world depends - could open 
itself. I6 Moreover, as the word “eye” already suggests, perception is a 
physiological process, and so is thinking. “A thinking creature without a brain 
is like a digesting creature without a stomach”, says Schopenhauer.” Such a 
statement sounds hardly less drastically “materialistic” than the notorious 
assertion of Schopenhauer’s favourite Cabanis about the brain, which secrets 
thoughts just as the liver secrets gall. Thus Berkeley and Kant are right and 
Cabanis is also right: a classical case of an antinomy, as Kant would have 
called it! Yet I would suggest that there are at least two reasons not to take this 
antinomy too seriously. First: Berkeleyanism is an idealism of sorts, just as we 
have seen Schopenhauer’s metaphysics (which was in part intended to solve 
this antinomy) to be a metaphysics of sorts. Berkeleyan idealism is not only 
quite different from Fichtean, but also from Platonic idealism, which has 
become the classical form of idealism in the West. All these idealisms share 
only one thing beyond their common predilection for the literary genre of the 
dialogue, which enables the author to take care that his own mouthpiece -
“Socrates” and “Philonous”, respectively - in the end always gets the upper 
hand. This common feature is a lack of trust in the world-view of “common 
sense”. But this distrust can take two diametrically opposed forms: distrust of 
the senses (Plato) and distrust of the constructions of the intellect (Berkeley). 
In scholastic terms: Plato is an extreme realist, Berkeley an extreme 
nominalist. Or, metaphorically: Berkeley is like a prisoner in Plato’s cave, who 
impatiently shrugs off the reports of the escaped prisoner and stubbornly 
clings to the shadows on the wall as the sole reality. Let us listen to what 
Berkeley has to say on this point (he aims it at Malebranche, but it might 
equally well have been aimed at Plato): 
Few men think, yet all have opinions.. . . Hence men’s opinions are superficial and 
confused. It is nothing strange that tenets, which in themselves are even so different . 
should nevertheless be confounded with each other by those who do not consider 
‘6swII, p. 35f. 
“SWIII, p. 70. 
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them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run 
into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He 
builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim.. . He asserts 
that we are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms 
and figures of extended beings; of all which Z hold the direct contrary. So that upon 
the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mineI 
(my italics, P.L.). 
In brief, Berkeley’s message is “trust your five senses, and the rest is talk”. 
Not quite so of course: there is still God. But obviously Berkeley was not an 
“idealist” in the Platonic sense of the word at all. He was a nominalist, and his 
polemic against the concept of “material substance” was probably aimed less 
at the attribute “material” than at the concept of “substance” itself, though it 
fell to his successor Hume to draw the full consequences from this insight by 
denying “mental” substance as well. Thus it is quite odd to see that, in the 
third book of Die Welt als Wille und Vorsteflung, Schopenhauer, who was no 
less of a nominalist than Berkeley and Hume, gives the Platonic Ideas such an 
important place in his system. Schopenhauer may well have been somewhat 
uneasy about this himself, as he used to insist that the Platonic Ideas are 
something quite different from general concepts. The reason is that, though 
not in space and time, they are nevertheless sinnlich erfassbar (especially for 
the artist’s eye), because they are the timeless archetypes of the phenomenal 
world. The Zdeen are, in scholastic terms, universalia ante rem, the Begrtffe 
universalia post rem. But to us this smacks rather of Goethe’s Urphtinomene 
than of Plato’s Ideas, which are not at all “sinnhch erfassbar”, but, on the 
contrary, are accessible only to pure thought, preferably to mathematical 
thought (which Schopenhauer disliked almost as much as Goethe did). The 
Platonic Ideas clearly form a Fremdkd’rper in Schopenhauer’s system, for in 
their original version they demonstrate Plato’s belief in the fundamental 
reasonableness and divinity of the world, whereas Schopenhauer’s Will- 
dominated world is very unreasonable and devilish rather than divine in 
nature. I can find one reason only for this “antinomy”, which to my mind is 
far more fundamental than the one cited above. The reason is that, as a 
(somewhat prodigal) child of the Enlightenment, Schopenhauer shrank 
intuitively away from the consequences of irrationalism. This is confirmed by 
the paradox that in Schopenhauer’s view the intellect, though originally an 
instrument and servant of the Will, can nevertheless, in its most enlightened 
form, see through the Will and even ultimately vanquish it. 
Be all this as it may, there is one more reason for not taking Schopenhauer’s 
original antinomy too seriously. What physiological processes in the brain and 
“Berkeley, op. cit., p. 67f. 
Schopenhauer’s Epistemology 279 
in the sense-organs have in common with psychological processes in the mind 
is at least that, in Schopenhauer’s words, they are confined to the region 
“underneath the skin”, i.e. that they have both to do with the individual 
knowing subject. And here, I think, lies the fundamental difference between 
Kant and Schopenhauer. Kant’s basic aim was to overcome Humean 
scepticism, however gratefully he acknowledged that it had awakened him 
from his “dogmatic slumber”. Kant derived his confidence that this would be 
possible from the evident success of modern science in explaining natural 
phenomena. It is surely not by chance that the motto for the second version of 
the Critique of Pure Reason is borrowed from Francis Bacon, the prophet of a 
new Humanity and its calling actively to act upon Nature and thereby to 
transform it, rather than merely passively to contemplate it. Humanity indeed, 
for we have here to do with a process that is essentially collective, or rather 
intersubjective - in view of the tremendous importance of the creative 
individual, in science no less than in art. Kant tried to find out what principles 
guide human reason by an internal investigation of its most successful 
products: pure mathematics and mathematical physics. By means of this 
transzendentallogische approach (which he insisted on keeping sharply 
distinguished from any “psychological” or “anthropological” approach) he 
hoped to demonstrate the apriori validity of certain forms of thought for all 
mankind - nay, for every possible thinking creature - while at the same time 
showing their inherent limitations by demarcating carefully the realm in which 
they could alone be meaningfully used. The contrast with Schopenhauer is 
obvious. Although the latter had a considerable reading in contemporary 
science and eagerly used everything that might fit into his metaphysical 
system,‘g he was in fact but little interested in science for its own sake. His 
basic aim was to explore the deeper layers of human personality by way of 
introspection, thus showing the way to salvation; consequently his 
epistemology is far more concerned with the - basically psychological - 
problem of the origins of immediate, perceptual knowledge than with the 
problem of the origins and legitimation of scientific knowledge. Or, to phrase 
the matter in Popperian terms, Kant’s main interest was in the problems of 
“World 3”, Schopenhauer’s in those of “World 2”!” Schopenhauer may be 
regarded as a precursor of those thinkers who, like Helmholtz and Lange, 
attempted to reinterpret Kantian philosophy in a psychological and even 
physiological sense. They did so under the slogan “Back to Kant!“, thereby 
reacting against he metaphysical systems of German Idealism. Justified as this 
reaction was, its neglecting of the transcendental nd logical aspects of Kant’s 
“Once more this is most conspicuous in Ueber den Willen in der Natur (see note 8). 
mCf. Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, especially Chapter 3: 
‘Epistemology without a knowing subject’ (Oxford, 1972), pp. 106 153. 
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work led almost inevitably to the positivism of Mach, which, like the earlier 
“psychologism” of Fries and Beneke, tended to obliterate the fundamental 
difference between Berkeley and Hume at one hand and Kant at the other. 
This in turn provoked the reaction of Frege, Marburg Neo-Kantianism, 
Husserl and others, who rightly protested against the intrusion of 
“psychologism” in the realm of logic, mathematics and science. It should not 
be forgotten, however, that positivists like Mach were, in their psychology, 
conventional associationists, quite unlike Schopenhauer or Helmholtz. And 
that is why, in spite of his “World 2”-outlook, a man like Schopenhauer was 
not unjustified in regarding himself as a legitimate heir to the Kantian 
revolution. For the active role of the human mind in constituting knowledge, 
which Kant so emphatically stressed, is indeed not confined to the scientific 
level, but is already present at the immediate, perceptual level. Kant himself, 
however, owing to his “World 3”-outlook, has precious little to say on the 
subject. “Knowledge’ ’ , he asserts at the beginning of the “Transcendental 
Logic’ ’ , “has two sources, namely receptivity for impressions and spontaneity 
in forming concepts: the former being the faculty of receiving representations, 
the latter that of recognizing an object by these representations. By virtue of 
the former an object is given to us, by virtue of the latter it is thought”.‘l 
Whereupon Schopenhauer retorts: “That is false: for in that case the 
impression, for which alone we have mere receptivity - which therefore 
comes from without and is alone, strictly speaking, “given” - would already 
be a representation, nay, already an object. But it is nothing but a mere 
sensation in the sense-organ, and it is only by using Understanding (i.e. by 
applying the law of causality) and the forms of perception (space and time) 
that our intellect transforms this mere sensation into a representation which 
from now on stands before us as an object in space and time. . . .“” 
Here we have Schopenhauer’s epistemology in a nutshell. In its most 
elaborate form it is to be found in the second version of Schopenhauer’s 
doctoral dissertation Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden 
Grunde (1847), particularly in the long section 21 (“Aprioritat des 
Kausalbegriffes - Intellektualitat der empirischen Anschauung - Der 
Verstand”), which, in this form, is entirely new in the second version. Further 
on we shall compare both versions in some detail; suffice it here to say that, 
shortly after the publication of the first version (1813), two decisive events 
occurred in Schopenhauer’s intellectual biography. One was his discovery of 
Indian thought - especially the Upanishads - which was to lay the 
foundation for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, whereas in the first version of the 
Vierfuche Wurzel metaphysics of whatever kind had still strictly been rejected. 
“Kurds Werke III, p. 74 and IV, p. 47 (my translation). 
22sw II, p. 520. 
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The other event was Schopenhauer’s encounter with Goethe’s theory of 
colour. And it is his resulting optical studies which were to lead Schopenhauer 
to the formulation of his own theory of causality; a theory which is still latent 
in the first verion of the Vierfache Wurzel, and which he stated explicitly in 
Ueber das Sehn und die Farben for the first time (1816). This little book is the 
literary fruit of Schopenhauer’s hort-lived collaboration with Goethe in the 
field of optics. Before discussing it, we shall briefly sketch Schopenhauer’s 
relation to Goethe. 
Schopenhauer and Goethe 
The quintessence of much of Schopenhauer’s later criticism of Kant is 
already anticipated in a significant complaint, made while he was a student, of 
Kant’s “complete lack of contemplation”. This contrasted unfavourably with 
the other great representative of the German mind: Goethe.23 Schopenhauer’s 
criticism springs from the same source as his impatient comment on Kant’s 
definition of the two sources of knowledge, which, as we have seen, confined 
the active role of the human mind to the conceptual level: According to 
Schopenhauer, Kant neglects intuitive (i.e. perceptual) knowledge 
(“anschauliche Erkenntniss”) in favour of abstract thinking, “though the 
latter derives all its importance and value only from the visible world, which is 
infinitely more important, more general and richer in content than the abstract 
part of our knowledge”.” According to Schopenhauer this one-sidedness was 
responsible for Kant’s abstruse, scholastic jargon, which made him speak of, 
for example, “transcendentale synthetische Einheit der Apperception”, where 
the simple word “ Vereinigung” would have done, and which provided his self- 
proclaimed “successors”, Fichte, Schelling, and above all Hegel with a 
welcome excuse for concealing their lack of thought behind incomprehensible 
words.2’ Schopenhauer by contrast, who had an excellent prose style and who 
always remained grateful to his father for having given him the opportunity to 
look around in the world before entering the university, always stressed the 
necessity of submitting all abstract concepts to the test of perceptual evidence. 
As an antidote against the verbiage of a certain kind of philosophical 
speculation this is an admirable precept. But it shows its limitations when 
confronted with the methodological needs of modern science. Schopenhauer 
himself unwillingly demonstrated this when, after having made the personal 
acquaintance of Goethe (1814), he allowed himself all too easily to be won 
over to the latter’s ill-fated polemic against Newton’s theory of colour. Their 
common ground was indeed what Gwinner called Goethe’s “aesthetic 
23 Cf. Hiibscher, op. cit., pp. 66 and 130. 
“SWII, p. 511. 
“‘Ibid., p. 508. 
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realism”. Realism: for this healthy pagan and man of the world was always 
distrustful both of philosophical speculation (especially if it took a 
Christianizing form, as in the later Schelling, or a panlogistic form, as in 
Hegel), and of the “morbid” inclination of Romanticism towards 
introspection and escapism. Aesthetic realism: for the poet and Naturkind 
disliked the “mechanistic” approach to Nature of modern science. Though he 
always spoke of pure mathematics with respect, Goethe was opposed to its 
application to Nature because of the quantitative reductionism it implied. 
And, although he sometimes did make use of simple experiments, he was on 
the whole opposed to the experimental method as well, because it “puts 
Nature on the rack”, 
Man himself, so far as he avails himself of his sound senses, is the greatest and most 
exact physical apparatus possible; and it is precisely the greatest evil of modern 
physics that is has, so to say, separated experiment from Man, wanting to know 
Nature only from the data of artificial instruments, and even to demonstrate 
Nature’s achievements that way, thus reducing those achievements to what can be 
demonstrated that way.26 
It goes without saying that this attitude connects Goethe with the romantic 
Naturphilosophie which was so popular in Germany at the time, in spite of his 
professed anti-romanticism and of the critical distance he kept towards a man 
like Schelling. The main difference is that Goethe, who, in his own words, 
“lacked the proper organ for philosophy”,27 was less speculative and more 
empirical; but “empirical” in the naive sense of unconditionally trusting the 
testimony of the senses. This is not to say that Goethe stopped at isolated 
phenomena. For example his botanic studies resulted in a theory on the 
metamorphosis of plants, a concept which clearly transcends immediate 
observation. What Goethe is always seeking for is the Urphtinomen. Normal 
phenomena are only variations of the Urphiinomen, which differs from the 
concepts of “mechanicist” science in that it can be aesthetically imagined. In 
the case of colour-phenomena this Urphtinomen is the elementary polarity of 
light and darkness, or of white and black. This explains Goethe’s bitter 
opposition to Newton’s Opticks with its theory that white light is compounded 
of rays of different refrangibility. For Goethe white light must of necessity be 
simple, since it appears as such to the eye, which does not deceive us. 
That all colours, mixed up together, produce white, is an absurdity which together 
with other absurdities people have been accustomed to repeat credulously and 
against all visual evidence, already for a century.” 
*6Goethes Werke in vierzehn B&den (Hamburg, 1948 - 1960) VIII, p. 473 (my translation). 
“Ibid. XIIZ, p. 25. 
“Ibid., p. 450. 
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For Goethe, colours owe their existence to the interplay of light and darkness 
by means of a turbid (trtibes) medium; they are therefore of a shadowy nature 
(skieron). 
Schopenhauer shared the admired poet’s dislike of the mathematical - 
experimental method of the official science of his day, albeit to a lesser degree 
(one wonders what he would have said of contemporary science which, though 
no longer “mechanicist” in the classical sense, is more mathematical than ever 
and thus hardly meets Schopenhauer’s requirement of perceptual evidence!). 
Thus he was readily convinced of the fundamental soundness of Goethe’s 
position in this controversy. However, his Kantian upbringing (“Kantian” in 
the “psychologist” interpretation we described in the preceding section) made 
him seek the ultimate explanation of the phenomenon of colour in the subject, 
which in this case means the perceiving eye. He agreed with Goethe on the 
homogeneity of white light and on the shadowy nature of colour, but he 
believed to have found the cause of the skieron, not in the activity of light 
itself, but in the activity of the retina, which may be either fully active or fully 
passive or partially active. In the latter case the phenomenon of colour arises, 
and the different colours correspond to different fractions of the full activity 
of the retina.2g 
It cannot, in the present context, be our aim to discuss the merits and 
shortcomings of Schopenhauer’s theory of colour in full. What is of interest o 
us here is the influence which Schopenhauer’s optical studies have exerted on 
the development of his epistemology. The main point is that it deepened his 
interest in, and his knowledge of, physiology, especially of the sense-organs 
and of the brain. This in its turn helped him clarify his position with respect o 
Kantianism. If already the sensation of colour (or, by extension, any other 
sensation) is not something purely passive, but is rather the activity (provoked, 
no doubt, by an outward stimulus, in this case by light) of a small piece of 
nervous tissue at the back of the eyeball, how much more must this be true for 
the functions of such an infinitely more complicated organ like the human 
brain! For it takes a decisive step to recognize colour, which originally is 
nothing but a sensation in the eye, as a quality of an external object, which acts 
upon the eye. In the sensation of “red” there is nothing which entitles us to say 
“this object is red”. Such an object exists only for Understanding (Verstand), 
which is a function of the brain. Now Schopenhauer was of course not the first 
to point out the crucial role of the brain in the process of transforming the raw 
material of sensation into conscious perception. His reading of contemporary 
physiologists gave him an important hint. Already before the time of his 
contact with Goethe he had read Flourens, who discovered the functions of the 
big and the small brain. Now he made the acquaintance of the aforementioned 
29SW I (“Ueber das Sehn und die Farben”), pp. 25 - 35. 
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Cabanis (“Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme”); and later 
followed Magendie, Charles Bell, Marshall Hall and above all Bichat 
(“Recherches physiologiques ur la vie et la mort”). His originality lies in his 
attempt at combining their purely physiological findings with Kant’s purely 
transzendentallogische doctrine of the a priority of the law of causality. In this 
combination lies the strength as well as the weakness of Schopenhauer’s 
epistemology, which we shall now inspect more closely. 
Schopenhauer’s Causal Theory of Perception 
“Alle Anschauung ist eine intellektuale” - this is the lapidary statement 
with which the first chapter (“On vision”) of Ueber das Sehn und die Farben3’ 
opens. Naturally this is not to be understood in the 
Schellingian- Hegelian sense of a higher form of knowledge. Quite the 
contrary, for we deal here with knowledge in the primitive, still unreflected 
form that man shares with the higher animals. Schopenhauer calls this faculty 
Vrestand, thus considerably modifying Kantian terminology. For Kant 
Vrestand was a discursive faculty; its instrument was the complicated 
mechanism of the twelve categories. In his “Kritik der Kantischen 
Philosophie” Schopenhauer throws 11 of these out the window; and he 
switches the only remaining one, causality, from the discursive to the intuitive 
domain, i.e. the domain of perception. He does this also in his treatise on 
vision and colour. Perception (Anschauung) should be clearly distinguished, 
according to Schopenhauer, from mere sensation (Empfndung). Perception 
involves the recognition of objects, which is possible only because our 
understanding (Verstand) relates any impression the body receives to its cause, 
which it then localizes in space. This immediate inference from an effect to its 
cause is the only function of Understanding - a faculty which, as already 
mentioned, we share with the higher, and to some extent even with the lower, 
animals. Reason (Vernunft) on the other hand belongs to mankind only. This 
is the faculty of forming concepts by way of generalizing from sense 
experience (for Kant, it will be remembered, Reason was the faculty of 
conceiving “ideas” that have no counterpart in sense experience - God, 
World, Immortality of the Soul; but Schopenhauer will have nothing to do 
with that). It is concepts like these which make possible the formulation of 
judgments (Urteife) and thus of science. Now of course the law of causality in 
“‘Ibid., p. 7. 
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its articulated form is also a judgment, and insofar it belongs to the domain of 
Reason. However, its unconscious, immediate application is the work of 
Understanding; as such it precedes discursive knowledge. And it precedes 
experience likewise, since it is the very thing which makes experience possible. 
The sense alone will not do. They are no more than spots on the body which 
are to a heightened egree susceptible to the effects of other bodies. Each of 
the senses is susceptible to one specific kind of effect, to which the others are 
little or not at all susceptible. So far Schopenhauer is in accordance with 
Johannes Miiller’s famous law of specific sense-energies. He departs from it, 
however, in maintaining next that the difference in sensation between the five 
senses has nothing to do with the nervous system itself, but only with the 
manner in which it is affected.3’ Now it is true that at the time of 
Schopenhauer’s writing Mtiller’s law was not yet known to science; yet when 
almost 40 years later Schopenhauer published the second edition of Ueber das 
Sehn und die Farben it had been known for a long time. The more astonishing, 
then, that, in this thoroughly revised edition, Schopenhauer not only left intact 
his old opinion (which he had derived from Cabanis’ Rapports du physique et 
du moral de I’homme) but did not even bother to dispute Mtiller’s theory. He 
simply seems not to have taken notice of it. Maybe Wilhelm Ostwald was right 
in ascribing this omission to the circumstance that Schopenhauer used to take 
more notice of the discoveries of foreign than of German investigators, whom 
he was a priori inclined consider as corrupted by university philosophy.32 
However this may be, what interests us here is that Schopenhauer’s theory 
of perception enabled him, in spite of his rejection of Kant’s proof of the a 
priority of causality,33 to cling nevertheless to this a priority, for which he 
believes to have found a better proof than Kant’s. “The child”, Schopenhauer 
says in an interesting passage which reads as an anticipation of modern 
developmental psychology and which we shall therefore quote at some length, 
“Ibid., p. 8f. 
32 Wilhelm Ostwald, Goethe, Schopenhauer und die Forbenlehre (Leipzig, 1918), p. 108. 
33 Cf. Section 23 of the second version of the Vierfache Wurzel(5 WI. DD. 85 - 93) and Section 
24 of the first version (SW VII, pp. 3 1 - 44). Just as he agreed in nrinci& with Kant’s theory of 
the Thing-in-itself, but rejected the way in which Kant had deduced it (see above, p. 275), so he 
agreed in principle with Kant’s theory of the a priority of the law of causality, but rejected the way 
in which Kant had deduced it. According to Kant the objective nature of the temporal succession 
of our perceptions is warranted only by the law of causality; Schopenhauer, however, argues that 
empirical phenomena can very well succeed each other without being causally related. According 
to Schopenhauer, Kant makes here the same mistake as Hume, but in the opposite direction: 
whereas Hume regarded all following from as a simple following upon, Kant regards each 
following upon as a following from, which is just as wrong. It should be added, however, that 
more recent accounts of Kant’s doctrine of causality have thrown some doubt on this 
Schopenhauerian interpretation of the doctrine. 
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during the first weeks of its life, feels with all its senses; but it does not perceive, does 
not apprehend; therefore it gazes stupidly into the world. However, it soon begins to 
learn to use Understanding, to apply the law of causality - of which it is aware 
before any experience - and to connect this law with the likewise a priori forms of 
all knowledge: space and time. Thus it proceeds from sensation to perception, to 
apprehension; and from now on it looks with sensible, intelligent eyes into the 
world. Since, however, each object affects each of the five senses in a different way, 
the effects nonetheless pointing to one and the same cause - which, just because of 
this, presents itself as an object - the child learns to perceive by comparing the 
diverse impressions it receives from the same object: it handles what it sees, looks at 
what it handles, traces back the sound to its cause, invokes the help of smell and 
taste, and finally it takes into account the effects of distance and lighting upon the 
eye. It gets acquainted with the effects of light and shadow and finally, with many 
pains, also with perspective, the knowledge of the latter resulting from the union of 
the laws of space and the law of causality, which are both present a priori in 
consciousness and only wait for application. Thereby the modifications which 
undergo both the inner conformation of each eye and the position of both eyes 
towards each other must be taken into account as well. At the level of 
Understanding, all these combinations are made already by the child; at the level of 
Reason, i.e. in abstracto, only by the the optician. Thus the child makes the 
manifolds sense data, according to the laws of understanding, of which it has a 
priori knowledge, into perception, by virtue of which the world presents itself as an 
object for the child. It is only much later that it learns to use Reason; only then it 
begins to understand speech, to speak himself and, strictly speaking, to think.34 
Schopenhauer illustrates all this by referring to some well-known optical 
phenomena. Thus he points to our perceiving objects upright, even though, 
due to the crossing of the lightrays when passing through the pupil, their 
impression on the retina is upside-down. There is also the fact that we perceive 
each object as single, although our two eyes are affected by it independently, 
so that we get a double impression. In all such cases Understanding 
immediately, and therefore unconsciously, corrects the false impression, 
tracing back the effect to its cause by following the direction from which the 
sensation came. It would not be able to do this if it had no apriori knowledge 
of the law of causality.35 
Now it is all very well thus to stress the intellectual nature of perception in 
order to save the a priority of causality. But it cannot be denied that the quoted 
passage about the young child also shows that the application of such an a 
priori given insight is something that must be learned. This truism seems to me 
illustrative of the difficulties into which Schopenhauer’s way of thinking 
“SW I (‘Ueber das Sehn und die Farben’), p. 10. 
“5Ibid., p. IOff. 
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almost inevitably leads, and which we shall examine in the next and final 
section. 
Conclusions 
On 23 February 1855, at Konigsberg, young Hermann Helmholtz delivered 
a lecture in which he sketched a theory of perception, whose basic concept, 
“unconscious inference”, is quite reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s theory of the 
intellectual nature of perception.36 A case of plagiarism? Inevitably it was 
regarded as such by the always slightly paranoid Schopenhauer. But of course 
it is quite possible that two thinkers arrive independently at similar 
conclusions. In this particular case this is even probable, in view of the general 
lack of interest of German scientists of that time in speculative philosophy - a 
natural reaction to the preceding epoch of German Idealism and romantic 
Naturphilosophie which, after the bitter remark of Alexander von Humboldt, 
was responsible for Germany’s relative backwardness in scientific 
development .37 In another lecture, delivered more than two decades later, 
Helmholtz implicitly defended himself against the charge of plagiarism by 
publicly dissociating his theory from Schopenhauer’s. He calls 
Schopenhauer’s theory “unclear and unjustified” and informs his audience 
that in later publications he has deliberately avoided the name “unconscious 
inference”, in order to escape being confused with “Schopenhauer and his 
adepts”.38 In his famous Handbuch der physiologischen Optik Helmholtz 
indeed uses the term “inductive inference” instead of “unconscious 
inference”, and stresses the importance of memory in the perceptual process, 
referring there to Stuart Mill’s System of Logic.3g This is more than a mere 
question of terminology. Although Helmholtz viewed himself as standing in 
the Kantian tradition, as we have already seen, he was always anxious to 
present his views as strictly “empiricist”. Despite the striking similarity 
between his own theory of perception and Schopenhauer’s he may therefore 
indeed have been sincerely puzzled by the way in which the latter presented it. 
For the Schopenhauerian version of the doctrine of unconscious inference 
does suffer from an inherent contradiction, which was due to Schopenhauer’s 
attempt to adapt Kantian a priorism not only to the findings of physiology 
(Helmholtz did that, too), but also to the needs of his metaphysical system. 
36Hermann Helmholtz, ‘Ueber das Sehen des Menschen’, in Philosophische Vortrdge und 
Aufstitze (Berlin, 1971), p. 76. 
“Briefe von Alexander von Humboldt an Varnhagen von Ense aus den Jahren 1827 bis 1858 
(Leipzig, 1860), p. 90. The way in which Naturphilosophie practised, say, chemistry, is nicely 
characterized there by Humboldt as “a chemistry, in which you need not wet your hands”. 
“Helmholtz, Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung (Berlin, 1879), p. 27f. 
39 Helmholtz, Handbuch der physiofogischen Optik (2. Aufl., Hamburg, 1896), pp. 578 - 583. 
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The contradiction is really quite obvious. According to Schopenhauer, like 
the Anschauungsformen of space and time, the law of causality is known to us 
apriori and is therefore (my italics, P.L.) wholly subjective. Yet on account of 
the very same law of causality we know, again according to Schopenhauer, 
that our sensations have external causes, which exist independently of us. This 
seems to imply either that Schopenhauer’s ubjective idealism is self-refuting 
or that our understanding deceives us. Or is there perhaps a way out? 
Schopenhauer would no doubt have answered (provided that he had not 
meanwhile lost his temper with this slow-witted opponent) that the 
contradiction is only apparent. In a sense, he would say, our understanding 
does deceive us, insofar as its domain is strictly confined to Die Welt als 
Vorstellung, which is nothing but the “Veil of Maya”, i.e. at the last resort an 
illusion. But inside its own domain its laws are valid a priori, and insofar the 
information with which it provides us is perfectly reliable. But this seems 
hardly a satisfactory answer, since it raises at once the question of the 
soundness of a metaphysical dualism, which inevitably leads to such (albeit, 
for all we care, only apparent) contradictions. 
Next to the introduction of the causal theory of perception, and apart from 
a load of fresh invectives against Schopenhauer’s philosophical rivals the 
introduction of this metaphysical dualism is the second important difference 
between the first and the second versions of Schopenhauer’s main 
epistemological writing Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes iorn 
zureichenden Grunde. Surely this new element does not improve the unity of 
the book. The first version had no other aim than to shed some new light upon 
one specific problem of (traditional) logic: the different forms under which the 
principle of sufficient reason can appear according to its subject-matter. But in 
the second version this logical investigation has been subordinated to the needs 
of the metaphysical system that Schopenhauer had conceived in the meantime. 
Let me mention just one significant detail. In the first version we read that, if 
we strip subject and object of all attributes that belong to a specific concrete 
case, there remain two abstractions: “pure intellect” at one hand, and “pure 
matter” at the other. And Schopenhauer continues; “This much becomes 
clear, however, that our investigation does not end in the rigidity of a thing-in- 
itself (my italics, P.L.), since also these two. . .can be conceived of and are 
meaningful only in mutual relationship, but disappear without it’r.40 This 
passage not only treats the thing-in-itself as the limit of human understanding 
and therefore as unknowable, just as Kant had done; it more-over completely 
“SW VII, p. 70. 
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rejects the entire concept.41 Of course this passage was suppressed in the 
second version, which does “end in the rigidity of a thing-in-itself”. True, this 
thing-in-itself is neither Pure Intellect (i.e. the hypostasized subject) nor Pure 
Matter (i.e. the hypostasized object), but something prior to both - the Will. 
Subject and object are and remain nothing but the two poles of Die Welt als 
Vorstelfung and so far Schopenhauer has remained true to his original 
conception. But what is new is that Schopenhauer had meanwhile learned 
from Indian thought that the whole Welt als Vorstellung is nothing but the 
Veil of Maya, behind which - and this is his own contribution - the all- 
pervading Will lurks as the ultimate reality. As mentioned before, 
Schopenhauer’s acquaintance with this exotic world dates from roughly the 
same period as his optical studies which resulted in his theory of colour and in 
his causal theory of perception - that is to say, the period between the 
publication of the first version of the dissertation (18 13) and the publication of 
his life work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1818). This is why these five 
years are of such decisive importance in Schopenhauer’s development - in 
fact it is the only period for which one can speak of any development at all. 
For after having completed his philosophical system at the age of 30, he spent 
the remainder of his rather long life with being right and with pouring scorn 
upon a world which was not prepared to give him his due.42 It is as tempting 
as it would be pointless to speculate on how Schopenhauer’s thought might 
have developed in case of a less premature conclusion. Might he not have 
found the way out at which we hinted above, that is the way from critical 
idealism to critical realism? 
“Of course young Schopenhauer rejected it for other reasons than did the German Idealists. 
Whereas they rejected it because they believed in the metaphysical identity of Thought and Being, 
Schopenhauer rejected it because at this stage of his development he still remained strictly within 
the limits of the empirical world and therefore regarded the Thing-in-itself as a metaphysical 
residue in Kant’s thinking. In section 42 of the first version of the Vierfuche Wurzel Schopenhauer 
has very neatly illustrated the difference between his own view on the subject-object relation and 
that of German Idealism. We there read: “Should the identity of the subjective and the objective, 
claimed by Nuturphilosophie, mean nothing but this indifference [namely that it amounts to the 
same thing whether one says: “the objects have these or those particular attributes”, or: “the 
subject perceives in this or that way”, P.L.1, I completely agree with it. I doubt, however, whether 
it means only this, since, in order to understand this, no intellektuale Anschauung is needed, but 
only reflection. If one wishes to call two things, the one of whom cannot be conceived without the 
other, for that reason one thing, I shall therefore not dispute this, for re intellecta in verbis simus 
fuciles, although I see only a necessary relation, which is admittedly the only predicate of these two 
related things. Exactly the same relationship exists, however, between other things, like cause and 
effect, father and son, or brother and sister. Neither of these can us such be thought of otherwise 
than together, since one term of each couple derives its meaning only from the other. Yet they are 
never for that reason called one, but always two, though admittedly they have in concrete always 
other predicates as well” (SW VII, p. 70). Perhaps the difference might be summarized by saying 
that for Naturphilosophie subject and object were identical, but for Schopenhauer only 
correlative. 
“This is not to deny that the later Schopenhauer, too, has written many delightful treatises (e.g. 
the already mentioned treatises on ethics, or the second volume of Die WeN uls WiNe und 
Vorstelhmg), but these are at the last resort only elaborations of the main work. 
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Hopefully it has in the meantime become clear that indeed there were from 
the beginning tendencies in Schopenhauer which pointed in that direction. 
Obviously his optical studies might have reinforced them. But even his “great 
discovery” of the all-pervading Will might have reinforced them as well, if it 
had not been turned into a new metaphysics, i.e. if Schopenhauer’s unjustified 
hierarchical distinction between inner and outer experience had not persuaded 
him to treat the phenomena of inner experience, not as phenomena, but as 
revelations of the thing-in-itself. In our imaginary case his profound 
psychological insight into the secondary nature of the intellect might have 
fertilized his epistemology, in that it might have guided him towards a new 
interpretation of the a priority of causality, in the sense of a biological urge to 
seek regularities in our environment. But in the way his epistemology is 
actually presented it suffers from two defects which, moreover, are mutually 
incompatible. The first of these is due to Schopenhauer’s transforming Kant’s 
phenomenal world into the Welt als Vorstellung, the second to his choosing 
nevertheless to stick to Kant’s apodictical conception of the a priori. As to the 
first, Schopenhauer’s transforming of Kant’s phenomenal world into the Welt 
als Vorstellung tempted him to consider the a priori as being by definition 
subjective, which is simply wrong. Take, for instance, the propositions of 
logic. These are certainly a priori valid, but for that very reason they are not 
subjective. Take, on the other hand, the principle of causality. For the reasons 
already given by Hume, this is in one sense subjective, but for that very reason 
it is not a priori valid. It may be nonetheless a priori (or so we believe with 
Kant and Schopenhauer), but only if we accept Popper’s distinction between 
psychologically or genetically a priori and a priori va1id.43 Such a distinction, 
however, would have been impossible for Schopenhauer to accept, since, in 
spite of his subjectivism, he stuck firmly to Kant’s apodictical conception of 
the a priori and thus ran into the contradiction, pointed out in the above. On 
the other hand the Popperian distinction has the merit of stressing the 
importance of learning (which is always to a large extent learning by mistakes) 
in the process of constituting knowledge - an importance which, at the level 
of ordinary, non-scientific knowledge, is also stressed by modern 
developmental psychology.U In the passage quoted above on the young child, 
we saw that Schopenhauer was on the verge of this insight. He might have 
reached it, if. . . 
But enough of if-history, which in the end is always unjust. It is almost 
symbolic that Schopenhauer died at virtually the same time when Darwin 
published his Origin of Species. Schopenhauer lived before the rise of modern 
biology and modern psychology and thus he could express his new insights 
“‘Cf. Popper, op. cit., p. 24. 
MCf. for example Jean Piaget, EpistPmologie gPnPtique (Paris, 1970), pussim. 
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only in the old language of metaphysics. We began this paper by observing 
that Schopenhauer stands between Enlightenment and Romanticism; we may 
add now that he also stands between Romanticism and later 19th-century 
realism. This may even contribute to his notorious “inconsistency”; but surely 
it contributes no less to his fascination for the student of the history of ideas. 
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